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KNOWLEDGE ABOUT A SPECIES’ CONSERVATION STATUS AND FUNDING 
FOR ITS PRESERVATION: ANALYSIS 
 
Abstract 
Using a species’ population to measure its conservation status, this note explores how an 
increase in knowledge about this status would change the public’s willingness to donate 
funds for its conservation. This is done on the basis that the relationship between the level of 
donations and a species’ conservation status satisfies stated general mathematical properties. 
This level of donation increases, on average, with greater knowledge of a species’ 
conservation status if it is endangered, but falls if it is secure. Game theory and other theory 
is used to show how exaggerating the degree of endangerment of a species can be 
counterproductive for conservation. 
 
Keywords: Conservation campaigns, conservation funding, conservation status, flagship 
species, game theory, prisoners’ dilemma, threatened species, value of information. 
  
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT A SPECIES’ CONSERVATION STATUS AND FUNDING 
FOR ITS PRESERVATION: ANALYSIS 
 
1. Introduction 
Information about the conservation status of a species influences the willingness of the public 
to donate funds or support changes in allocation of funds for its preservation, e.g., public 
funds (Samples et al., 1986; DeKay and McClelland, 1996; Tkac, 1998; Gunnthorsdottir, 
2001). Other things constant, the more endangered members of the public believe a species to 
be (if it is a threatened species), the larger is the financial sum that members of the public are 
willing to commit for its conservation. Bandara and Tisdell (2005) found that this sum 
increases at an increasing rate as the endangerment of a threatened species rises, when 
endangerment is measured by reduced abundance of the species. 
Although there is evidence that financial support for conservation programs for a species 
increases as its perceived degree of endangerment rises (Samples et al., 1986; DeKay and 
McClelland, 1996; Tkac, 1998), there is no systematic study of how reduction in uncertainty 
about the conservation status of a species might alter the public’s support for programs to 
conserve it. This note explores this issue using a general mathematical property of the 
willingness to pay for the conservation of a species as a function of its abundance of the type 
obtained empirically by Bandara and Tisdell (2005) for the Asian elephant. 
The change in the public’s expected willingness to pay for programs to conserve a species 
as its information improves may be used as a measure of the value of information (or 
reduction in uncertainty) about its conservation status. The analysis measures the comparative 
value of reducing this uncertainty in different conservation situations and therefore has policy 
relevance. This note outlines the basis of the analysis and the general procedures adopted and 
then presents the analysis and results. A discussion and conclusions follow. 
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2. Procedure and Analytical Basis  
The population level of a species is used to indicate its conservation status. Bandara and 
Tisdell (2005) found that a sample of Sri Lankans, when confronted with a hypothetical 
decrease in the population of the Asian elephant in Sri Lanka (compared to its current 
population), were willing to increase their stated willingness to contribute funds for the 
conservation of the elephant at a rate increasing with its posited population decrease. On the 
other hand, while this sampled group was willing also to increase its financial contribution 
for funding the conservation of the Sri Lankan elephant population when the level of this 
population was hypothetically increased (compared to its current level), the stated amount 
they were willing to donate increased at a decreasing rate. 
Thus, the function relating their aggregate willingness to donate funds for the conservation 
of the Asian elephant had two branches of the nature illustrated in Figure 1 by function 
ABCDE. Bandara and Tisdell (2005) hypothesized that the nature of the branch ABC reflects 
the fact that as the level of population of the species declines, it becomes more endangered. 
Respondents, therefore, probably assumed that increasingly urgent ‘conservation’ action 
would be needed on an increasing scale to save elephants in Sri Lanka from extinction with 
greater declines in the elephant population. They may have also assumed that at the current 
level of elephant population (xc) in Sri Lanka, survival of the elephant in Sri Lanka is 
relatively assured. Thus for higher levels of populations, there is virtually no risk of 
extinction of the elephant in Sri Lanka. 
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Fig. 1. Hypothetical relationship of the willingness of individuals to donate funds to 
conserve a species as a function of its abundance based on Bandara and Tisdell 
(2005). 
 
If this is so, the risk of extinction of the elephant will not be an influence on the 
willingness of individuals to contribute funds for conservation of the elephant if its 
population is xc or greater. Support for conservation of larger populations of the elephant 
depends in this case mainly on the utility that individuals obtain from its greater abundance. 
This utility seems to increase with rises in the level of the population of elephants but at a 
decreasing rate. This is reflected in the nature of the relationship CDE showing the 
willingness of individuals to donate funds for sustaining high population levels of the 
elephant. However, at high population levels of the species, its increased abundance may 
reduce the utility obtained by individuals from its presence. This would mean that the right 
hand branch of the function shown in Figure 1 would eventually turn downwards. But this 
extreme will not be considered here.  
Assume that the type of function illustrated in Figure 1 applies for the relevant range of 
population levels of a focal species, where xc represents its minimum relatively safe 
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population level. In the case illustrated in Figure 1, the function of the willingness to fund 
conservation of the species has a cusp at point C. However, an alternative possibility is the 
type of function illustrated in Figure 2. This function is differentiable everywhere but that in 
Figure 1 is not differentiable at point C.  
Generalizing from the results obtained by Bandara and Tisdell (2005), the left hand branch 
of the willingness to donate curve appears typically to be more convex than its right hand 
branch is concave. It seems also to be steeper than the right hand branch. 
The implications of the elimination of uncertainty about the population level of a focal 
species will now be explored mathematically for the type of relationships indicated by 
Figures 1 and 2. 
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Fig. 2.  An alternative possible form of the relationship shown in Figure 1. 
 
3. Analysis and Results 
For simplicity, assume that the ‘true’ mean or expected value of the focal species’ population 
is initially known but not its actual level of population. Suppose that the level of donations 
for the conservation of the species in this uncertain situation will be the same amount as when 
 4
the actual population level of the species equals its expected population. For example, if the 
expected level of the population is x1 in Figure 2, the corresponding level of donations would 
be y1. 
How would the expected level of donations for the conservation of the species alter if its 
exact level of population happened to be known by donors? The difference between the 
expected level of donations if the exact population of the species happened to be known and 
the previously mentioned sum indicates the impact of knowledge on level of donations for the 
species’ conservation. Its absolute value measures the value of knowledge in terms of 
adjustment of conservation funding. 
 
Mathematically, 
 
   (1) ])[()]([ xEfxfED −=
 
represents the expected change in the level of donations for conserving a species as a result of 
having perfect information about its population level rather than imperfect information. 
If values of x occur only for , and not all x are equal, then . When the species is 
threatened at all possible levels of population, increased knowledge of the species’ population 
level raises the amount donors are willing to donate on average for the species’ conservation. 
This follows because f(x) is strictly convex for
cxx ≤ 0>D
cxx ≤ . See theorem 90 in Hardy et al. (1934, 
p.74). 
On the other hand,  if  because f(x) is strictly concave for . Thus, for a 
species known to be secure but for which the exact level of its population is unknown, perfect 
knowledge about its population level can be expected, on average, to reduce the level of 
donations for its conservation.  
0<D cxx ≥ cxx ≥
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A third case is possible. It may be unclear whether the species is threatened or not. In such 
a mixed case, D may be positive or negative. D is more likely to be positive, the higher is the 
likelihood that the species is threatened or the lower is the possible level of its population, 
other things constant. 
If |D| is used to measure the value of information about the species, this will be greater if 
the species is threatened than if it is secure because the degree of convexity of the left hand 
branch of f(x) is greater than the degree of concavity of its right hand branch. This can be 
illustrated easily if each branch of f(x) is approximated by a quadratic function. 
 
Let the left hand branch of f(x) be represented by  
 
  for  (2) 2cxbxayL +−= cxx ≤
 
and let its right hand branch be specified by 
 
  for  (3) 2sxrxkyR −+= cxx ≥
 
The expected value of a quadratic function depends only on the mean and variance of its 
independent variable. For example, 
 
  (4) xcxcExbEayE L var][][][
2 −−+=
 
where var x represents the variance of x. 
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In this case, lack of knowledge or uncertainty about the population of the focal species can 
be measured by the size of var x. Relationship (2) shows that eliminating uncertainty about the 
population of a threatened species will increase donations for its conservation, on average, by 
c var x, E[x] constant. Similarly, if the species is secure, eliminating uncertainty will reduce 
donations for its conservation by xs var .  
Furthermore, given the theoretical relationship presented in the previous section,    c > s. 
Therefore, the change in the expected level of donations resulting from the elimination of 
uncertainty is greater when the species is threatened than when it is not, if var x is the same in 
both cases. If the variation in the expected level of donations for the conservation of a species 
is used to measure the value of information about its conservation status, the value of 
obtaining or providing information about its status is usually higher when it is threatened than 
when it is not. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
The results indicate that if a species is threatened, reduction in uncertainty about its 
conservation status is likely to increase the amount of donations or support for conservation 
programs for it on average, but reduce these if it is not threatened. However, in both cases the 
extra information will be of value but more so if the species is threatened. Furthermore, the 
expected increase in the value of donations for conservation of the species as a result of 
elimination of uncertainty tends to be higher if the species is threatened than the reduction in 
the expected level of this support if the species is secure. These results depend upon the 
donation or willingness-to-pay function having the general form indicated by Figures 1 or 2. 
This type of relationship should be investigated further. For example, the relevant function 
could exhibit hysteresis. There could, for instance, be tendency to want to pay increasing 
amounts to avoid any reductions in the current population level of a species provided it is not 
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regarded as a nuisance. If so, there would be opposition to reducing the level of the current 
population of a species even if it is not threatened. This would be consistent with the 
endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Note that when x, the population level of a focal species, becomes very low and survival of 
the species becomes increasingly improbable, f(x) could begin to fall with reduced levels of 
population of the species. This case is not covered here. However, DeKay and McClelland 
(1996, pp. 70-71) found that members of the public may still continue to financially support 
programs for the conservation of an endangered species even when they are unlikely to 
succeed in conserving the species, even though, according to Possingham et al. (2002, p. 503), 
“spending the most money on species with the highest extinction probabilities is not the most 
efficient way of promoting recovery or minimizing global extinction rates…”  
If a species is threatened, bodies that want to maximize support for species’ conservation 
might think it is advantageous to convince the public that the species is more endangered than 
it really is. However, such an approach is risky. 
First, if the degree of endangerment of a particular species is exaggerated by a 
conservation body and the public become aware of this, they may discount the reliability of all 
the information provided by the body and overreact in doing so. 
Secondly, if individual conservation bodies champion different species and exaggerate the 
threat to them, the net result could be that the inflated claims offset one another as far as the 
level of donation of funds is concerned. 
For example, suppose that only a constant sum is available from the public or government 
for the conservation of threatened species and that there are two different conservation bodies 
promoting the conservation of different threatened species. Suppose that each has two 
alternative strategies to obtain conservation funds for its chosen species: (1) accurately 
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communicate the likely conservation status of its chosen species or (2) exaggerate the threat to 
the species. This can be modeled as a two-person constant sum game. Table 1 illustrates. 
The entries in the body of the matrix in Table 1 specify hypothetical donations in millions 
of dollars for conservation of the species as a function of the strategies adopted by the 
conservation bodies. Both conservation bodies have an incentive to exaggerate. Otherwise, if 
one exaggerates and the other does not, the one that does not exaggerate loses funds. The 
adoption of exaggeration strategies by the players results in a Nash equilibrium in this game 
(Nash, 1951). However, the strategy of exaggerating the threat to species does not increase the 
amount of available funds for conservation of either of the species in this case. In fact, if extra 
funds are needed to promote the exaggerated threat to a species, the funds available for the 
species’ conservation are reduced. The problem is therefore equivalent to a prisoners’ 
dilemma problem (Poundstone, 1992) and the outcome is socially sub-optimal. 
 
Table 1 Hypothetical game theory matrix involving two conservation bodies with two 
alternative strategies: either do not exaggerate or exaggerate the threat to each of 
the species they champion. 
 
Strategies of body one
Strategies of body two
 
 
Do not exaggerate 
Exaggerate 
Do not exaggerate 
β1 
α1 (5, 5) 
α2 (8, 2) 
Exaggerate 
β2 
(2, 8) 
(5, 5) 
 
This two-species case is, of course, a simplification. When a larger number of species are 
considered, the set may include some species that are threatened but which do not have social 
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bodies advocating or strongly advocating their conservation. Conservation funds may, 
therefore, be drawn away from conservation of their species in favor of the species that have 
bodies strongly advocating their conservation and which may even exaggerate the threat 
facing their favored species. As a result, the overall wildlife conservation effort becomes 
distorted.  
The promotion of a particular flagship species, as described by Waddell (2002, p. 243), 
may increase the total conservation funding available to it but at the expense of some other 
species because of the presence of a financial substitution effect.  However, if the flagship 
species is also an umbrella species, and if the species experiencing reduced conservation 
funding obtain conservation benefits under its umbrella, there maybe no problem.  In fact, 
conservation outcomes for the flagship species and all those species under its umbrella may 
improve with no other species disadvantaged. Nevertheless, this outcome is more likely to be 
a happy coincidence than a regular event. 
The influence of information provision about the conservation status of wildlife species 
can be complex. Nevertheless, as a threatened species becomes more endangered and this 
becomes known, the public can be expected to increase the level of their donation and support 
for its conservation. If the conservation status of a species is uncertain, reducing or 
eliminating uncertainty about this can be expected, on average, to raise the willingness of the 
public to donate funds for its conservation. Exaggerating the degree of endangerment of a 
threatened species is liable to be a short-sighted policy. It can spark off inflated claims of 
endangerment and result in discounting of accurate information by those who become aware 
of the exaggeration, and may draw conservation funds away from other threatened species, 
some of which may be more endangered than the favored species. It has little to recommend 
it. 
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